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Sustainability has rapidly become a key challenge for agribusiness companies regardless of their 
position along the supply chain or their geographic focus (Lubin and Esty 2010; Vermeir and 
Verbeke 2006). As a response to this challenge, agribusiness firms are attempting to interact ef-
fectively with a much broader set of stakeholders, including not only supply chain actors and in-
vestors, but also governments, knowledge institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
and other civil society organizations (Jenkins et al. 2007; Rankin and Boehlje 2010; Van Laten-
steijn and Andeweg 2010). This process of interaction related to sustainability, especially in the 
last decade, has led a number of large agribusiness firms to form and/or participate in multi-
stakeholder alliances. 
 
Multi-stakeholder sustainability alliances (herewith after MSSAs) would appear to be of growing 
importance for the agri-food sector, yet this phenomenon has not been analyzed within the agri-
business literature and is still scarcely studied in business research (Kourula and Laasonen 2010; 
Selsky and Parker 2005). Introducing MSSAs to agribusiness research is thus timely and crucial. 
This paper uses an inductive, theory-building approach to: 1) suggest a definition of the phenom-
enon based on describing a set of MSSAs formed and/or joined by many of the world’s largest 
food and beverage multi-national corporations (MNCs) (Food and Beverage International 2009); 
2) propose a theoretical framework on how MNCs use MSSAs to effectively signal to their 
stakeholders that they are sustainable; and, 3) suggest a set of methods to test the theoretical 
framework in future research.  
 
Empirical  evidence  supporting  the  development  of  the  framework  was  collected  from:  (1) 
MNCs’ sustainability and corporate reports, (2) press releases and reports by stakeholders both 
within and outside MSSAs, and (3) on-going public discussions with business managers, NGO 
leaders and academics participating in MSSAs (specifically, the Sustainable Agriculture Initia-
tive Platform and Transforum) and other sustainability initiatives (the Carbon Disclosure Project 
and Round Table on Responsible Soy). These discussions took place during the International 
Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA) conferences between 2008 and 2010. 
The framework suggested in this study will assist agribusiness managers to develop partnerships 
with their stakeholders that result in effective signaling of sustainability.  
    
Two additional points frame this analysis of MSSAs. First, MNCs are not the only users of 
MSSAs.  Companies of smaller size and with a domestic focus form and/or join MSSAs (Van 
Latensteijn and Andeweg 2010) as well. Yet, MNCs appear to be more inclined to undertake the-
se  alliances  and  face  greater  complexity  in  their  stakeholder  interactions.  Therefore,  smaller 
scale, domestic companies are not treated in the analysis. Second, MNCs may form and/or join 
MSSAs for reasons other than credible signaling of sustainability to their stakeholders. For ex-
ample, MSSAs may also be used to share resources with stakeholders in order to establish and 
reach jointly agreed sustainability objectives. This paper focuses on and analyzes only signaling 
as a reason for  MSSAs existence, and  leaves to future research  the exploration of other reasons  
for MSSAs.  
    
The fundamental research question is this:  why are MNCs forming and participating in MSSAs 
as a significant part of their corporate sustainability strategy? The answer explored in this paper 
relates to the role an MSSA can play in an MNC credibly signaling to other economic, social and Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




environmental actors that it is committed to and engaged in sustainability practices.  The intui-
tion about the need for credible signaling arises from the complexity and uncertainty about what 
constitutes sustainability behavior and results.  Sustainability encompasses systemic economic, 
social and environmental outcomes in the context of multiple stakeholders who often have dra-
matic and passionate differences in values and perspectives.  Mistrust among stakeholders is 
likely  high  and  direct  observations  of  an  MNC’s  sustainability  efforts  is  likely  impractical.  
MNC self-declarations of sustainability are not likely credible in this context.  Nor are supply 
chain business partners credible in the eyes of governmental and societal organizations.  The 
general proposition explored is that engagement in MSSAs is one of the few (if only) ways to 
credibly signal a MNC’s progress in sustainability.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, MSSAs are described and de-
fined. In the third section, relevant concepts from stakeholder theory, theory of reasoned action 
and status theory are introduced before the theoretical framework is developed in the fifth sec-
tion. Based on this framework, directions for future research are presented in section five and 
then conclusions follow. 
 
Description and Definition of MSSAs 
 
In the last ten years, twenty-two out of the world’s largest fifty MNCs in the food and beverage 
sector formed and/or joined a number of partnerships with  heterogeneous stakeholders (Table 1 
and 2). Actors partnering within these alliances include many, if not all, of the following stake-
holders: supply chain partners, competitors, investors, governments, knowledge institutions, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations. Specifically, nine out 
of the ten largest MNCs participate in at least one of these partnerships. All these partnerships 
can be described as MSSAs. 
 
However, MSSAs are not the only means of implementing sustainability initiatives. The majority 
of the mentioned MNCs have developed one or more of the following: (1) a strategic model for 
sustainability (such as Nestlé’s “Shared Value Creation” model; Nestlé 2010), (2) pursuit of a 
variety of specific activities that are usually reported according to recently developed environ-
mental and/or social standards (such as the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative 
and the Carbon Footprint Disclosure), and (3) initiatives in bilateral partnerships with only one 
other stakeholder (such as Nestlé’s Nespresso E-Collaboration with Rainforest Alliance or Coca-
Cola’s partnership with the WWF).  MNCs have been developing sustainability models and one-
partner  alliances  since  the  early  1990s;  their  participation  in  multi-stakeholder  alliances  has 
emerged more recently. 
The largest MNCs such as Nestlé, PepsiCo, Kraft and Unilever – which each own a portfolio of 
brands diversified into a number of food sub-sectors - are participating in a large number of alli-
ances that  cover multiple food sectors with a broader focus including both environmental and 
social sustainability (Kraft 2010; Nestle’ 2010; Unilever 2010). Less diversified and relatively 
smaller MNCs such as Bunge, Ferrero and Cadbury focus mainly on sustainability alliances with 
a particular sector (cocoa, palm oil, cashew and coffee) which corresponds more closely with 
their core strategy. A few MNCs, including Nestlé, Kraft and Unilever, have been very active in 
founding or co-founding a number of multi-stakeholder alliances, demonstrating strategic intent 
to build  core competence and leadership in tackling sustainability issues. Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Table1. MNCs in Multi-Stakeholder Sustainability Alliances in the Agri-food Sector 
Source. Sustainability Reports and Company Websites of the mentioned MNCs; Food and Beverage (2008). 







Name(s) of Multi-Stakeholder Sustainability Alliance(s) 
Nestlé  101,580 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, International Cocoa Initiative, 
World Cocoa Foundation, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil,  
4C Association,  Water Footprint Network 
Pepsi Co  43,251 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Sustainable Agriculture Initiative  
Platform, GAIN Business Alliance, Water Footprint Network 
Kraft Foods  42,201 
International Cocoa Initiative,  Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform,  
African Cashew Alliance, 4C Association. 
Unilever  58,570 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil, GAIN Business Alliance,  Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative,  
Novella Africa Initiative,  Global Packaging Project,  Water Footprint 
Network. 
Coca-Cola Company  31,944 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform,  GAIN Business Alliance,  Com-
munity Water Partnerships,  Water Footprint Network 
ADM Company  69,816 
International Cocoa Initiative,  World Cocoa Foundation,  Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil,  World Initiative for Soy in Human Health. 
Mars  30,000 
IMPACT Partnership, International Cocoa Initiative, GAIN Business Al-
liance, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. 
Cargill  120,439 
International Cocoa Initiative, GAIN Business Alliance, Soy Moratorium 
Working Group – GTS,  World Initiative for Soy in Human Health,  Flour 
Fortification Initiative. 
SABMiller  25,302  Water Footprint Network Initiative Platform, GAIN Business Alliance. 
Danone  22,375  Sustainable Agriculture  
Heineken  21,030  Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform,  Water Footprint Network 
General Mills  14,691  Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform,  Flour Fortification Initiative 
Fonterra  14,560 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform,  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil 
Kellogg Company  13,750 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil. 
ConAgra Foods  12,745  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Femsa  15,081 
Water Center for Latin America and the Caribbean, Alliance for Water 
Partnership, GAIN Business Alliance. 
Sara Lee Corporation  13,212 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, 4C Association, Dutch  
Sustainable Trade Initiative, Global Packaging Project. 
HJ Heinz Company  10,155  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Ajinomoto  11,515  Ajinomoto Stakeholder Dialogues 
Bunge  52,574 
Soy Moratorium Working Group – GTS, World Initiative for Soy in Human 
Health. 
Cadbury  9,960  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Ferrero  9,135  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Table 2. Multi-Stakeholder Sustainability Alliances in the Agri-food Sector 
 
MNCs’ Multi-Stakeholder  
Sustainability Alliance(s) 
     Sector 
     Focus 
 
Sustainability Focus          Stakeholders Involved  Year  
Founded 
Sustainable Agriculture 
 Initiative Platform 
Multiple  Environmental 
& Social 
Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Intl  
Organizations, Knowledge Institutions 
2002 




Competitors, International & Local 
NGOs, Intl Suppliers 
2002 
IMPACT Project 
Cocoa  Environmental 
& Social 
Intl & Local NGOs, Government Agen-
cies, Intl Organizations, 
 
World Cocoa Foundation 
Cocoa  Environmental 
& Social 
Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Gov-
ernment Agencies, Intl Suppliers, Intl 
Organizations, Knowledge Institutions 
2000 
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil 
Palm Oil  Environmental 
& Social 
Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Intl 
and Local Suppliers, Intl Retailers, Intl 
Organizations, Investors 
2004 
African Cashew Alliance 
Cashew  Environmental 
& Social 
Intl & Local NGOs, Government Agen-




Coffee  Environmental 
& Social 
Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Intl 
and Local Suppliers, Intl Organizations, 
Knowledge Institutions 
2004 
Global Packaging Project,  
Consumer Goods Forum 
Packaging  Environmental  Competitors, Intl Suppliers, Intl Retail-
ers, Knowledge Institutions 
2010 
GAIN Business Alliance  -  Social  Competitors, Intl NGOs, Intl Suppliers  2002 
Dutch Sustainable  
Trade Initiative 
Multiple  Environmental 
& Social 
Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Gov-
ernment Agencies, Intl Organizations. 
2007 





Intl & Local NGOs, Government Agen-
cies, Intl Organizations, Knowledge In-
stitutions. 
2002 
Alliance for Water Partnership  Water  Environmental  Intl NGOs, Knowledge Institutions.  2007 
Ajinomoto Stakeholder Dia-
logues 
Multiple  Environmental 
& Social 
Intl and Local NGOs, Knowledge  
Institutions. 
2009 
Soy Moratorium Working 
Group – GTS 





Water  Environmental  Intl NGOs, Intl and Local Suppliers, Intl 
Organizations. 
2005 
World Initiative for Soy in 
Human Health 
Soy  Social  Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs,  
International Suppliers 
2000 





Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Intl 
and Local Suppliers, Intl Organizations, 
Knowledge Institutions 
2000 
Water Footprint Network 
Water  Environmental  Competitors, Intl & Local NGOs, Intl 
Organizations, Knowledge Institutions. 
2008 Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




However, these MNCs seem to interpret the role of multi-stakeholder alliances within their sus-
tainability  strategy  differently.  Nestlé  co-founded  multi-stakeholder  alliances  mainly  with  its 
competitors (such as SAI Platform and International Cocoa Initiative) and separately founded 
individual partnerships with NGOs but without its competitors (such as Nespresso E- Colabora-
tion and Nescafe’ Plan) (Nestle’ 2010). In contrast, Unilever seems to be adopting a more inte-
gral “multi-stakeholder approach” to sustainability by participating exclusively in alliances with 
multiple stakeholders in all its sustainability initiatives (Unilever 2010). 
The heterogeneity of the group of stakeholders participating in a sustainability alliance provides 
important insight into the mission of the alliance and the type of information shared among part-
ners. The first type of alliance that can be observed, such as the World Cocoa Foundation, the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, attempts 
to include the broadest possible heterogeneity of stakeholders.  Private businesses, NGOs, gov-
ernmental departments  and development agencies, international organizations and knowledge 
institutions (RSPO 2010, SAI Platform 2010, WCF 2010) are all deliberately brought into the 
alliance. In these alliances, a key initial step is seeking consensus on an “operational” definition 
of sustainability. Once a common definition is developed, partners meet in smaller groups to im-
plement specific sustainability projects where each stakeholder provides technology or human 
capital.  
A second type of alliance has less heterogeneity among its stakeholders. Among this second type 
are alliances such as the IMPACT Partnership, the 4C Association and the Water Footprint Net-
work. They are mainly driven by public development actors, including (1) local civil society or-
ganizations and international NGOs such as African trade unions and Oxfam International re-
spectively, (2) international organizations such as the World Food Program and  (3) government 
agencies such as the German Development Agency (GTZ) and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (4C Association 2010; IMPACT partnership 2010; Water Footprint Net-
work 2010).  In these alliances, MNCs mainly play the role of providing capital and technical 
assistance to the partnership.  
A third type of alliance is mainly business-driven, such as the Global Packaging Project of the 
Consumer Goods Forum (2010) and the GAIN Business Alliance (2010). These alliances have 
an organization similar to either supply chain partnerships (in the case of the Global Packaging 
Project) or to joint CSR initiatives (in the case of the GAIN Business Alliance).  The key differ-
ence with this type of alliance is that more than one stakeholder external to the supply chain is 
also involved to facilitate the information exchange on sustainability. 
These observations on the various types of MSSAs that have emerged suggest the following def-
inition for the phenomenon:  A multiple-stakeholder sustainability alliance is a long-term part-
nership involving multiple participants from two or more categories of stakeholders (govern-
ment, business, societal organizations, and knowledge institutions) with the objective of jointly 
defining and reaching sustainability objectives. Consistent with Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
and Cronin et al. (2011), categories of stakeholders include  governments, international organiza-
tions and NGOs, business entities (competitors, investors, supply chain partners, and industry 
groups), consumers and community representatives. Moreover, knowledge institutions (such as 
universities, research centers and think-tanks) are added as potential MNCs’ stakeholders in the 
context of sustainability given their active role in many of the MSSAs observed.  Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




This definition excludes (1) partnerships between only one  MNC and one category of stakehold-
er (such as MNCs receiving Rainforest Alliance and UTZ certifications or Marine Stewardship 
Council accreditations, or MNCs partnering with their competitors and customers to form the 
Sustainable Packaging Coalition), (2) initiatives  merely based on sustainability reporting to an 
NGO or international organization (such as the Global Reporting Initiative, the Carbon Disclo-
sure Project and the United Nations Global Compact), (3) joint declarations of intents on sustain-
ability (such as the European Food Sustainable Consumption and Production Round Table), and 
(4) joint short-term sustainability projects formed for only a limited purpose and then disbanded. 
Literature Review 
Three distinct bodies of literature are reviewed and used in the framework presented in the next 
section. 
Stakeholder Theory and Sustainability 
 
Stakeholder theory provides a conceptual basis to develop a framework for how MNCs can use 
MSSAs as a signal of sustainability. The central message of stakeholder theory is that organiza-
tions should aim at maximizing not only their own profits, but also maximizing benefits or min-
imizing damages to other organizations and/or individuals as possible effects of their activities 
(Freeman 1984). Specifically, the three concepts of stakeholders, stakeholder interactions as crit-
ical to corporate strategy, and the formation of alliances with stakeholders are crucial to the de-
velopment of this framework.  
 
First, stakeholders are broadly defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives" (Freeman 1984, p. 46). However, in the 
case of large and trans-national companies, this definition of stakeholders can potentially include 
every member of society, leaving managers without a strategic direction for managing interac-
tions with them. Narrower definitions identifying stakeholders in terms of their necessity for the 
firm's survival (Nasi 1995) lead to pragmatically exploring under which conditions a firm’s man-
ager should give attention and priority to stakeholders’ claims (e.g., Mitchell, Agle and Wood 
1997). Consistent with these definitions, Donaldson and Preston (1995) mentioned national gov-
ernments, international organizations and NGOs, competitors, investors, supply chain partners, 
consumers and community as categories of any firm’s stakeholders. Together with knowledge 
institutions, these categories are considered as “stakeholders” in the proposed framework. 
 
Second, firms’ interactions with stakeholders play a central role within their corporate strategy. 
According to Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), firms’ managers take stakeholders into consid-
eration when they are powerful (Pfeffer 1981) and when their claims are considered both as le-
gitimate (Davis 1973) and urgent (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997). However, managers have to 
consider the whole stakeholders’ network in which they are embedded, as this determines the 
direction of influences between a firm and its stakeholders (Rowley 1997). Initially, stakehold-
ers’ claims on sustainability were perceived as legitimate but not urgent nor powerful by firms’ 
managers (Brummer 1991) and therefore sustainability strategies were left to the morality or eth-
ics of firm’s managers (Carroll 1991). However, as time passed empirical evidence grew  that 
stakeholders were pressuring firms on social and environmental issues and they gained  suffi-
cient influence to affect the value creation of firms (Kassinis and Vafeas 2006). More recently, it Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




was found that firms’ developing environmental (Baker and Sinkula 2005) and social strategies 
(Luo and Bhattacharya 2009) in interaction with stakeholders had a positive impact on the devel-
opment of their own capabilities (Brown and Dacin 1997, Hult 2011), marketing assets (Krishna 
and Rajan 2009) and ultimately on their own financial performance. 
 
Third, firms’ alliances with their stakeholders are not an optional part of their sustainability strat-
egies. Given its distinctive characteristics, sustainability is an example of a “wicked problem: 
complex, ill-defined, messy and unsolvable in any traditional sense” (Peterson 2009). Complexi-
ty mainly arises from the need to have economic, environmental, and social systems all interact 
to produce sustainability while the messiness springs from the situation that the plurality of a 
firm’s stakeholders has very different definitions, capabilities, values and perceptions related to 
sustainability  (Porter  and  Kramer  2006).  These  potentially  significant  differences  in  values 
means that stakeholders outside the supply chain can be motivated to take actions that will con-
strain a firm’s strategies through governmental assaults on the right to produce or through citi-
zen-lead efforts to curtail the right to sell if the firm does not behave more sustainably either in 
reality or in the perception of any one of the stakeholders. Given its “wicked problem” nature, 
building sustainability alliances was found to have a positive impact on both firms and their alli-
ance partners’ marketing assets and financial performance (e.g., Brown and Dacin 1997; Lich-
tenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). A narrower research strand 
has started conceptualizing the role of cross-sector social partnerships (Selsky and Parker 2005) 
among companies, governments and/or NGOs (Kourula and Laasonen 2010).  
 
Yet, empirical evidence of the impact of cross-sector social partnerships or sustainability allianc-
es on a firm’s financial performance is still scarce since most of the research in this field has fo-
cused on the process of alliance formation and development rather than on its outcomes (Kourula 
and Laasonen 2010). Moreover, the specific effects of multi-lateral alliances for sustainability 
have not been explored yet. This paucity has recently called for further business research in the 
field (Cronin et al. 2011). 
 
Theory of Reasoned Action and Sustainability 
The framework proposed in this paper also uses Fishbein and Ajzen’s psychology theory of rea-
soned action (1975) to provide insight into what drives the behavior towards MNCs of stake-
holders within and outside MSSAs. According to this theory, a person’s behavioral intentions are 
driven by his/her attitude towards that behavior and by his/her subjective norms. Specifically, a 
person’s attitudes towards a behavior are based on his/her perception that the behavior will have 
consequences as well as on his/her evaluation of these consequences. Finally a person’s behav-
ioral intentions predict behavior if the intention measure corresponds to the behavioral criterion 
in terms of action, target, context, time-frame and/or specificity (Figure 1). The theory has prov-
en useful to predict behavior accurately, although with identified limitations (Sheppard, Hart-
wick and Warshaw, 1988). The theory of reasoned action provides three essential concepts to the 
framework developed in this analysis: perceptions, subjective norms and behavior. First, MNCs’ 
stakeholders have perceptions about the extent a company is sustainable or not, however they 
define, conceptualize and measure sustainability. These also drive their perceptions on the con-
sequences of their behavior supporting or contrasting MNCs’ sustainability strategies. For exam-
ple, consumers may perceive that stopping buying from a company which is believed not to be 
truly sustainable will make them feel that they are doing something positive for the environment Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




they live in. Policy-makers may perceive that tightening regulations affecting companies that 
they not believe are sustainable will have a positive impact on their chances of being re-elected. 
On the other hand, shareholders and equity funds may perceive that they will have relatively 
lower-risk future returns if they invest in a company which they believe is truly sustainable. In 
turn, stakeholders’ perceptions of the consequences of such a behavior drive their attitudes to-















Figure 1. The Theory of Reasoned Action 
Note. Boxes represent variables and arrows represent positive relationships between two variables. 
 
Second, MNCs’ stakeholders have subjective norms that also influence their intended behaviors 
supporting or contrasting companies. Subjective norms are defined as "the person's perception 
that most people who are important to him or her think he should or should not perform the be-
havior in question" (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). In other words, a person’s intention of taking ac-
tion also depends on how he/she thinks other people would view him/her if he/she performed the 
desired behavior. For example, when deciding whether buying products from a company which 
is perceived to be unsustainable or not, consumers may have subjective norms based on the opin-
ions that their friends and family would have about their behavior. Similarly, policy-makers, 
NGOs, investors and business partners have subjective norms based on the opinion that their 
electors, supporters and customers would have of their behavior towards a company. 
 
Third, stakeholders’ behaviors are driven by their perceptions of and attitudes towards their ac-
tions and by their subjective norms. Importantly, their behaviors towards MNCs have an impact 
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focused on how consumers behave based on their perceptions and subjective norms related to the 
sustainability of the firm (Ogle, Hyllegard, and Dunbar 2004; Van Trijp and Fischer 2011; Ver-
meir and Verbeke 2006). A few studies also applied the theory of reasoned action to explain and 
predict other stakeholders’ behaviors towards a firm as a reaction to its sustainability strategy, 
including policy-makers (Marshall, Cordano, and Silverman 2005), civil society (Ballantyne and 
Packer 2005), competitors and employees (Gilder, Schuyt, and Breedijk 2005). Yet, the theory of 
reasoned action has not been used to explain the effects of a MNC forming a MSSA on its stake-
holders’ behavior.  
 
Social Status and Sustainability 
 
The idea of status, i.e. an actor's position in the social structure, as a key driver of social and eco-
nomic  rewards  is  a  fundamental  insight  of  the  sociological  theory  (Simmel  1950).  Status  is 
strongly linked to the concept of deference from other actors (Goode 1978); while deference can 
be understood as a “flow”, then status is the “stock” that corresponds to this flow (Parsons 1963). 
Although reaching a high status can be considered as an end in itself (Frank 1985), an actor’s 
status also brings economic rewards by influencing the relative opportunities open to that actor in 
comparison with those available to its competitors (Podolny 1993). 
  
There are two fundamental ways an actor’s status can open opportunities to that actor and gener-
ate economic rewards. First, status is a signal of quality (Podolny 1993), as it raises potential 
buyers’ expectations of a product’s qualities and value (Spence 1974). Importantly, the larger the 
uncertainty or difficulty in observing a product’s quality, the stronger status becomes a signal 
(Podolny 1994). For example, in an artistic genre one in which objective standards are limited, 
and therefore uncertainty about quality is high, the perceived quality of a painter’s work depends 
on the painter's relations to high-status actors and institutions in the artistic community (Green-
feld 1989). Similarly, when great uncertainty surrounding scientific quality is pronounced, for 
example during times of pronounced intellectual conflict or paradigmatic transition, the profes-
sional regard for a scientist and interpretations of the quality of the scientist's work are based on 
the status of those with whom the scientist actively and visibly affiliates himself/herself (Camic 
1992; Latour 1987). Second, status can be considered as a means toward enhanced power over 
other individuals (Weber 1978). As such, the higher the status of an actor, the higher the proba-
bility of being considered as a “significant other” by other actors when undertaking their psycho-
logical process from attitudes to behavior.  
 
In this paper, we argue that the dual role of an actor’s status as a signal of quality and as a means 
of enhanced power over other actors is crucial to understanding – in integration with stakeholder 
theory and the theory of reasoned action - how MNCs use MSSAs to signal sustainability to their 
stakeholders. Researchers have analyzed the role of other signals of MNCs’ sustainability, such 
as adhering to voluntary reporting standards (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative, Nicholaeva 
and Bicho 2011), yet no studies have explored the key role of stakeholders’ status within MSSAs 




The proposed framework is presented in Figure 2.  Its general flow of logic is taken from the 
theory of reasoned action.  Alliance partners’ favorable behavior toward an MNC’s sustainability Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 





strategy derives from the beliefs and attitudes of key stakeholders as defined by stakeholder theo-
ry and the status of these key stakeholders within the alliance as defined by the theory of status.  
The  alliance  partners’  behavior  in  turn  influences  the  beliefs  and  subjective  norms  of  non-
alliance stakeholders with ultimate influences on MNC marketing assets and financial perfor-
mance.    The  framework’s  logic  incorporates  all  three  underlying  theories  and  explains  how 
MNCs use MSSAs to signal sustainability to their stakeholders within and outside the alliance. 
 




































Dynamics between Alliance Partners and Other MNC’s Stakeholders 
 
Figure 2.The Proposed Conceptual Framework: The Impact of a Multi-National Corporation 
(MNC) building Multi-Stakeholder Alliances on Sustainability 
Note. Boxes represent variables and arrows represent positive relationships between two variables. 
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The remainder of the section explores the causal links in the framework through the positing of 
six research propositions.  These propositions are divided into two sets: one relating to the dy-
namics among alliance partners (upper half of the framework) and one relating to the dynamics 
between alliance partners and stakeholders outside the alliance (lower half of the framework). 
The first set of propositions proposes an explanation for how MNCs signal sustainability to their 
alliance partners or, in other words, change their alliance partners’ perceptions and behaviors. 
The second set of propositions describes how MSSA partners’ behavior has an impact on the 
perceptions and behaviors of stakeholders outside the alliance and ultimately on MNCs’ market-
ing assets and financial performance. 
 
Dynamics among Alliance Partners 
 
The first three propositions that follow lay out the logic that leads MNCs  to build an effective 
signal of their focus on sustainability. MNCs often begin by developing interactions with part-
ners with whom they had no or little prior relationship– i.e. they develop “weak ties” or “bridg-
es” (Granovetter 1973) with these partners. The second characteristic of these partners is that 
they tend to have high status (Podonly 1993) in their respective arenas of influence. Once the 
partners are selected and the sustainability alliance formed, a MNC can use the information ex-
change and the joint design and implementation of sustainability initiatives within the alliance as 
the credible signals that favorably change its partners’ beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and 
ultimate behaviors towards support of the MNC’s sustainability strategy. 
  
The first proposition addresses the formation of weak ties.  A first example of MNC weak ties or 
“bridges” with a key stakeholder is the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) created in 
2004 by Unilever and WWF together with Unilever’s competitors, other international and local 
NGOs, supply chain partners, international organizations and investors. Up to 2004, Unilever 
and WWF had no relationships or structure for exchanging information, although both these or-
ganizations had interests in forests in South America, Asia and Europe. Specifically, before 2004 
WWF  had  already  been  acting  as  watchdog  and  awareness  leader  on  safeguarding  forests 
worldwide (WWF 2004), while Unilever had supplied palm oil for its food products from the 
mentioned forest areas. A few months before the creation of the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm 
Oil in 2004, WWF denounced that seven of eight existing forest certification schemes, including 
the ones implemented by Unilever, were inadequate in protecting sustainability and called “upon 
companies and forest stakeholders to continue serious engagement for credible forest certifica-
tion instead of seeking an alibi for forest destruction and business as usual”. After five years of 
joint work with Unilever and other stakeholders, WWF announced that RSPO “developed prin-
ciples and criteria on sustainable palm oil production to ensure that palm oil production is eco-
nomically  viable,  environmentally  appropriate  and  socially  beneficial”.  Moreover,  WWF  an-
nounced that “by October 2009, some 195,000 tons of certified sustainable palm oil (CSPO) had 
been traded. This is a good start, but still only represents about 19% of the estimated 1 million 
tons of CSPO that has been produced so far. WWF is working to encourage companies to source 
100% CSPO in the products they make and sell”.  
 
Two  additional  examples  of  “building  weak  ties”  between  MNCs  and  international  NGOs 
through MSSAs are the 4C Association (2010) and the Alliance for Water Stewardship (2010). 
In the 4C Association case, Nestlé and Kraft started communicating in 2002 with the internation-Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




al NGO Oxfam and other stakeholders with the facilitation of the German development agency 
GTZ. Oxfam had been pressuring Nestle’ and its major competitors through its global campaign 
“Make Trade Fair” prior to 2002 (Oxfam 2010), but an effective formal relationship with MNCs 
in the coffee sector only started with the creation of the 4C Association. Through a constant dia-
logue with the MSSA secretariat and partners, Oxfam has been making clear that its participation 
in the alliance does not mean Oxfam is endorsing the MNC products approved by the alliance 
code of conduct; however, Oxfam guarantees its participation only if its expectations regarding 
the alliance organization and practices are satisfied (Oxfam 2005). In the Alliance for Water 
Stewardship (2010) case, the Coca-Cola Company started a joint initiative with WWF and Na-
ture Conservancy, while there was  no record of communication between these stakeholders be-
fore the alliance. WWF recognized in 2010 that “the partnership has helped integrate perfor-
mance and water stewardship initiatives into the company’s operations, improving Coca-Cola’s 
water efficiency by 13 percent since 2004, well on its way toward reaching a 20 percent im-
provement goal by 2012” (WWF 2010). All three cases cited show how the establishment of 
weak ties through MSSAs was followed by a change in attitudes about MNC partners.  
 
On the other hand, there are MSSAs where no weak ties or “bridges” among partners need to be 
built, as the partners were already collaborating or sharing a common culture before the alliance 
start-up.  Three  examples  are  the  Global  Packaging  Project  of  the  Consumer  Goods  Forum 
(2010),  the  GAIN  Business  Alliance  (2010)  and  World  Initiative  for  Soy  in  Human  Health 
(2010). In the first case, the alliance partners were already collaborating as global supply chain 
partners, while the universities involved in the multi-stakeholder alliance had already undertaken 
previous collaboration with Unilever. As a result, while the project has the objective of setting 
common  sustainability  standards,  sharing  know-how  and  developing  reciprocal  capabilities, 
there is no evidence that any change in alliance partners’ beliefs and attitudes is taking place. In 
the second and third cases, the sustainability alliances link multiple MNCs to NGOs (Ashoka, 
Clinton Global Initiative, Helen Keller International, Catholic Relief Services) and international 
organizations (International Finance Corporation, UNICEF and World Food Program) which had 
previous dual partnerships or other types of relationships with the industry. Again in these cases, 
MNCs are not building new “bridges” with their alliance partners and do not need to change their 
partners’ beliefs and attitudes. 
 
Based on this exploratory evidence, we state the following proposition:   
 
P1. If it develops weak ties (or “bridges”) with multiple stakeholders through sustainability 
alliances, the MNC increases its partners’ beliefs that the MNC has an effective sustainability 
strategy and the alliance partners will ultimately act favorably toward this strategy. 
 
Second, evidence exists that building multi-stakeholder sustainability alliances moves partners’ 
subjective norms to be more inclined towards acting favorably to the MNCs strategies when oth-
er alliance partners have higher status. This evidence is exploratory mainly due to the tentative 
measurement of subjective norms and status proposed herein. First, as subjective norms are diffi-
cult to measure directly in this context, we measured subjective norms indirectly based on the 
responses of “significant others” to the decisions of MNCs’ alliance partners to act favorably to 
MNCs strategies. This implies that stakeholders deciding to join a sustainability alliance implic-
itly need to ask themselves: “what will significant others think and how will they react and affect Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




me if I ally myself with a MNC?” Second, consistent with Podolny’s theory (1994), we tentative-
ly measure an actor’s status based on the number of declarations of “deference” (Parsons, 1963) 
that the actor receives regarding sustainability. Therefore, we consider actors that have been 
broadly and frequently cited for their past work on environmental and social issues as having 
“high status”, while actors receiving few citations for their past work in the same field are con-
sidered as having “low status”. The tentative measurement of these variables and the exploratory 
nature of their relationship certainly justifies further research in this domain as discussed in next 
section. 
 
Based on these tentative measures, we found that when participating in MSSAs with other high-
status actors, the alliance partners have generally not been accused of “greenwashing.”   That is 
an MSSA has not been accused by stakeholders external to the alliance of collaborating to pro-
vide a superficial “green” look to MNCs that are making no real change towards sustainability. 
For example, we could find no cases of MSSAs being accused of greenwashing even on ex-
tremely  delicate  issues  (such  as  the  Soy  Moratorium  Group  (2010)  and  the  4C  Association 
(2010)) when the MSSA had a large and diversified number of high-status stakeholders includ-
ing governmental agencies, NGOs, universities and international organizations. Similarly there 
have been no greenwashing accusations made toward  the thematic working groups created with-
in the SAI Platform (2010). They too involve a large and diversified number of stakeholders with 
high status.  
 
On the other hand, greenwashing accusations have been made of (1) bi-lateral alliances or certi-
fication schemes involving only one high-status stakeholder and (2) MSSAs with a number of 
actors that are “low status”. Bi-lateral alliances examples accused of “greenwashing” by other 
stakeholders include the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (e.g., GMwatch 2010; Holland et al. 
2008)  with  the  WWF  (normally  considered  high-status),  and  the  environmental  certification 
schemes (e.g. Jaffee 2007) with the NGO Rainforest Alliance (considered of lower status than 
the WWF). Cases of multi-stakeholder alliances accused of “greenwashing” include the Interna-
tional Cocoa Initiative (2010), which has NGOs and trade unions of relatively lower status, and 
to some extent the RSPO (2010), which has a small and undiversified number of high-status 
stakeholders. 
 
Based on this exploratory evidence, we state the following proposition:   
 
P2. The higher the status of the alliance partners, the stronger is the impact of the multi-
stakeholder alliance on other alliance partners’ subjective norms for acting favorably to the 
MNC’s sustainability strategy. 
 
Consistent with the theory of reasoned action, we posit that MNCs’ alliance partners act favora-
bly to a MNC’s sustainability strategy when the partners’ beliefs that the MNC has a sustainabil-
ity focus are strong, when their attitudes towards acting favorably to the MNC are positive and 
when their subjective norms do not prevent them from acting favorably to the MNC. In this ex-
plorative study, we observed three types of “favorable acts” of alliance partners towards the 
MNC. First, some alliance partners actively endorsed or provided a positive evaluation of the 
MNC’s effort towards sustainability within the scope of the alliance. This is the case of Amnesty 
International declaring the efforts of the Ajinomoto Group (2010) of moving towards socially Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




responsible practices and the case of the Rainforest Alliance endorsing Nestlé and Kraft for their 
effort in the development of dual and multi-stakeholder alliances on sustainability (e.g. Kraft 
2010). Second, more often, the MNC explicitly mentions the name of “high status” alliance part-
ners in sustainability reports and press releases to justify their effort in defining, implementing 
and measuring sustainability with that high-status partner as part of their core business. In this 
second case, the alliance partner provides a “passive endorsement” to the MNC. This is the case 
of WWF and Oxfam participation to the RSPO and 4C Association alliances, where these NGOs 
claim that their continued participation in the alliance is subject to the progress made by their 
business partners towards sustainability (e.g., Oxfam 2005). Third, alliance partners act favora-
bly to the MNC by stopping the release of negative information on a certain behavior(s) of the 
MNC when they observe a positive change from previously unsustainable practices. For exam-
ple, Greenpeace stopped providing negative information on Cargill and other MNCs on the spe-
cific themes  under discussion in  the alliance after the establishment  of the Soy Moratorium 
Group (2010). Therefore, we state the following proposition:   
 
P3. The interaction between sustainability alliance high-status partners’ attitudes and subjec-
tive norms is positively associated with their behavior of acting favorably to the MNC’s strat-
egies. 
 
Dynamics between Alliance Partners and MNCs’ Stakeholders outside the Alliance 
MNCs communicate the activities undertaken by MSSAs mainly through reports and press re-
leases (e.g., Kraft 2010; Nestlé 2010; Unilever 2010).  These are the potentially effectively sig-
nals of sustainability to the larger set of MNCs’ stakeholders outside the alliances. At the same 
time, some MNCs’ alliance partners - specifically NGOs with a mission of advocacy and aware-
ness-raising on sustainability issues – use their information released through reports and press 
releases as “carrots and sticks” depending on MNCs’ efforts towards more sustainable practices 
(e.g. Greenpeace 2010; Oxfam 2010; WWF 2010).   
 
Despite the signaling intent of MNCs and of some of their alliance partners, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no direct evidence of the impact of multi-stakeholder alliances on the behav-
ioral intentions or behavior towards MNCs of these other external stakeholders. Recent literature 
found that a set of positive information from different sources related to the sustainable practices 
of a firm has a positive impact on consumers’ attitudes towards the firm and on intentions of act-
ing favorably to it (Dentoni et al. 2011; Tonsor et al. 2005), but these studies are based on hypo-
thetical experiments and involve only one category of stakeholders (consumers). The declared 
signaling intent of MNCs and some alliance partners and the scarce empirical evidence collected 
so far makes testing this relationship very important in future research. Therefore, based on the 
exploratory evidence provided and consistent with the theory of reasoned action, we state the 
following proposition:   
 
P4. Sustainability alliance partners’ behavior of acting favorably to  a MNC’s sustainability 
strategy is positively associated with other external stakeholders’ (1) beliefs that the MNC has 
sustainability focus, (2) their attitudes towards acting favorably to the MNC and (3) their ac-
tual behavior of acting favorably to the MNC’s sustainability strategy. 
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When presenting multi-stakeholder alliances on sustainability to other stakeholders through press 
releases and annual sustainability reports, MNCs often highlight the importance of their alliance 
partners’ contribution to define, implement and measure jointly undertaken sustainability initia-
tives. MNCs often describe their alliance partners with deference to justify their alliance part-
ners’ choices (e.g. Cargill 2010; Fonterra 2010; Sara Lee 2010).. MNCs thus use the status of 
their alliance partners to signal their focus on sustainability to their stakeholders outside the alli-
ance.  
 
While the use of alliance partners’ status as a signal of MNCs’ sustainability focus is evident, to 
the best of our knowledge research has not analyzed the impact of MNC alliance partners’ status 
on other stakeholders’ beliefs and attitudes towards the MNC. Consistent with Podolny (1993 
and 1994), recent agribusiness research found that the status of endorsing actors outside the sup-
ply chain has a role on beliefs and behaviors of a firm’s customers and final consumers (Dentoni 
and Reardon 2010) but these findings were in a context different from sustainability alliances. 
Moreover, other research analyzed the impact of endorsers’ credibility on consumers’ beliefs and 
buying intentions again in different contexts from sustainability alliances (Dentoni et al. 2011; 
Frewer, Howard, and Shepherd, 1998). The relationship between endorsers’ status and credibility 
has not been explored.  
 
The importance attributed by MNCs to the relationship between alliance partners’ status and the 
beliefs, attitudes and consequent behaviors of stakeholders external to a sustainability alliance, 
together with the current paucity of research in this domain, makes testing the following proposi-
tion important for future research:  
 
P5. The higher the status of MNC sustainability alliance partners, the stronger is the impact 
of alliance partners’ behavior of acting favorably to the MNC on other external stakeholders’ 
beliefs that the MNC has an effective sustainability strategy. 
 
Finally, through their annual reports and press releases, MNCs often declare that they consider 
sustainability strategies as necessary not only because they are of crucial importance to the future 
of planet and people, but also due to the practical relevance for their survival and for enhancing 
innovation by developing sustainability skills, knowledge and reputation within the MNC organ-
ization (e.g., Dutch Sustainable Initiative 2010). Through MSSAs, MNCs clearly intend to gen-
erate improved financial performance together with improved environmental and social perfor-
mance. This intention is consistent with the triple-bottom line concept (Elkington 1998) and the 
concept of sustainability as an opportunity to learn from a larger group of stakeholders (Cronin et 
al. 2011; Hult 2011). Despite these MNCs’ stated intentions, little empirical evidence exists on 
the impact of MSSAs and of MNC alliance partners’ acting favorably on the value of MNCs’ 
marketing assets and on the MNC’s financial performance.  This lack of evidence may simply 
arise  because a sufficiently long series of historical data on MNC performance is not yet availa-
ble to measure these relationships. This makes it interesting to test the following proposition in 
future research:   
 
P6. Other stakeholders’ behavior of acting favorably to the MNC is positively associated with 
the  value  of  MNC  marketing  assets  and  with  MNC  financial  performance.  Specifically, 
MNC’s financial performance and market value is enhanced by greater consumer acceptance Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




of its products, greater access to capital from investors, and fewer obstacles to strategy im-
plementation by non-supply chain stakeholders, e.g., governments and NGOs. 
 
The framework and the six propositions are presented in Figure 2. They provide a first answer to 
the questions posed at the end of the first section. In particular, the framework  proposes that 
MNCs’ forming or joining MSSAs effectively changes alliance partners’ perceptions and behav-
iors if multiple partners are involved in this process and if MNCs ally themselves with partners 
who have high status.  By first influencing attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of high-status 
partners within the alliance, MNCs can effectively change attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of 
the larger group of their stakeholders outside the alliance. Under these conditions, MSSAs could 
ultimately have a positive effect on MNCs’ marketing assets, and financial performance.  
 
Discussion: Research Opportunities and Implications 
 
We identify a number of opportunities to be explored in future research (Table 3) by comparing 
the proposed framework with the existing literature on sustainability in agri-food value chains.  
We posit that multidisciplinary research testing the stated propositions would lead to key impli-
cations  for  both  MNC  managers  and  other  stakeholders  deciding  to  participate  in  or  create 
MSSAs to signal sustainability to its stakeholders.   
 
Specifically, by testing the stated propositions P1 to P3 related to the dynamics among MNCs 
and their partners within MSSAs, agribusiness research has the opportunity to tackle the follow-
ing broad question:  how can a MNC choose partners and build relationships with them in an 
MSSA to effectively signal sustainability to all its alliance partners and to favorably change their 
behavior towards the MNC?  However, testing these propositions may present a number of chal-
lenges in terms of methods of measurement and analysis. Measurement challenges are mainly 
given by common rater’s social desirability biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003) if the variables of in-
terest such as rater’s beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and behavioral intentions are measured 
with direct questions to MNC managers, alliance partners and other stakeholders. Analytical 
challenges mainly refer to the risk of misspecification error if a significant variable is not identi-
fied and included in the framework (Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner 2004).  
 
We suggest the use of the following range of research methods to tackle these challenges and test 
the suggested propositions effectively. First, researchers can conduct natural experiments where 
the creation of weak ties and of a sustainability alliance among multiple stakeholders is the “nat-
ural” treatment and alliance partners’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviors are measured. Specifically, 
panel data (Wooldridge 2002) effectively measure the dynamic change of the measures over time 
and the impact of the creation of weak ties and sustainability alliances. Moreover, multivariate 
statistical approaches such as latent growth models and hierarchical linear models (Duncan et al. 
1999; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) allow the dynamic analysis of both individual variables (re-
lated to individual alliance partners) nested within “group variables” combining direct questions 
to alliance partners and the use of qualitative analysis software on alliance partners’ reports and 
press releases (Barry 1998). Second, case-based grounded theory methods (Eisenhardt 1989) 
would allow the collection a richness of data which describes the process of alliance creation in 
detail and decreases the risk of misspecification errors in future research. Specifically, grounded 
theory would allow further exploration of the conditions under which the creation of sustainabil-
ity  alliances  influences  alliance  partners’  beliefs,  attitudes  and  behaviors.  Third,  simulation Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




methods such as agent-based modeling (Bonabeau 2002) would allow a dynamic analysis of how 
stakeholders would react according to their expected benefits, costs and risks of participating in 
MSSAs and of acting favorably or unfavorably to MNCs’ sustainability strategies. Once ex-
pected benefits, costs and risks are validated through discussions with the interested actors and 
experts on MNCs’ sustainability strategies, agent-based modeling allows the study of a simulated 
iterative chain of reactions across stakeholders until an equilibrium point is reached (Bonabeau 
2002). This type of simulation would effectively tackle the measurement challenges of social de-
sirability biases of the interested actors (Table 3).     
 
Table 3. Suggested Research Directions on the Role Multi-Stakeholder Alliances as Signals of 





Analytical Models  Key Variables of Interest  Research Questions 












Weak Ties between 
Alliance Partners (X), 
Alliance Partners’ Beliefs 
and Attitudes (Y) 
 
 
How can a MNC 
choose partners and 
build relationships 
with them in a multi-
stakeholder 
sustainability alliance 
to effectively signal its 
sustainability focus to 
other stakeholders?  
Grounded Theory  Case-Based 
Analysis 
Conditions under which 
Weak Ties between 
Alliance Partners (X) 
impact Partners’ Beliefs 
and Attitudes (Y)  
 
P2 
Simulations  Agent-Based 
Models 
Alliance Partners’ Status 
(X), Other Alliance 




Simulations  Agent-Based 
Models 
Alliance Partners’ 
Subjective Norms, Beliefs 
and Attitudes (X), Alliance 











Alliance Partners’ Status 
and Alliance Partners’ 
Behaviour (X), Other 
Stakeholders’ Beliefs and 




behavioural change of 





behaviour towards the 
MNC and ultimately 
on MNCs’ marketing 





Simulations  Agent-Based 
Models 
Alliance Partners’ Status 
and Alliance Partners’ 

















Beliefs and Attitudes (X), 
MNC’s brand equity and 
corporate reputation (Y) 
Natural 
Experiments  





Beliefs and Attitudes (X), 
MNC’s financial 
performance (Y) 
Simulations  Agent-Based 
Models 
Other Stakeholders’ 
Beliefs and Attitudes (X), 
MNC’s financial 
performance (Y) 
Note: X represents the independent variable of interest, Y represents the dependent variable of interest. Dentoni and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




By testing the stated propositions P4 to P6 on the dynamics among partners within MSSAs and 
external stakeholders, agribusiness research has the opportunity to tackle the following broad 
question: under which conditions does the behavioral change of an MNC’s partners in a MSSA 
influences external stakeholders’ behavior towards the MNC and, ultimately, the MNCs’ market-
ing assets and financial performance? To test the suggested propositions, we propose the use of 
the following range of research methods. First, hypothetical experiments can be used to test the 
potential change in beliefs, attitudes and behavioral intentions of stakeholders that are outside the 
sustainability alliance under study. In this case, depending on the stakeholder under study, treat-
ments can be manipulated by the researcher with pieces of information on the creation or out-
come of MSSAs, similarly to a large established strand of consumer economics and behavior re-
search (Lusk et al. 2004; Rao and Sieben 1992). Second, through both hypothetical and natural 
experiments with stakeholders, research can also test the moderation role of alliance partners’ 
status on the relationship between their favorable behavior towards the MNC participating to the 
alliance and the reactions of other stakeholders external to the alliance and the mediation role of 
alliance partners’ credibility (Frewer, Howard, and Shepherd 1998). Ultimately, both hypothet-
ical and natural experiments can be used to test the impact of the reactions of stakeholders exter-
nal to sustainability alliances on MNCs’ brand equity, corporate reputation and financial perfor-
mance. Finally, to avoid social desirability biases in hypothetical experiments, simulations such 
as agent-based models (Bonabeau 2002) can be used to analyze how other stakeholders react to 




This study had three objectives. First, it aimed to introduce a new and still scarcely studied phe-
nomenon of great importance for the current global agri-food context, which is the formation of 
MSSAs by MNCs in the food and beverage sector. Second, it suggested a multidisciplinary con-
ceptual framework to analyze how MNCs use MSSAs to signal sustainability to their stakehold-
ers. Third, it discussed the use of a set of methods to effectively test the developed multidiscipli-
nary framework in future research. The importance of key concepts from the domains of man-
agement, psychology and sociology can be effectively applied to the agribusiness arena and spe-
cifically to the analysis of agri-food firms’ sustainability strategies. As described, the application 
of concepts from different disciplines and of the appropriate methods of measurement and analy-
sis can open up wide opportunities for future research and collaboration between business and 
academia.  
 
The results of this study can be synthesized as follows. First, there is exploratory empirical evi-
dence that MSSAs have recently become a key element of the largest MNCs’ sustainability strat-
egy in the global food and beverage sector. Second, MNCs are more likely to change alliance 
partners’ beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and behaviors towards MNCs when they develop 
weak ties with their partners and when partners have a higher status. Third, MNCs and their 
partners in MSSAs aim at influencing external stakeholders’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to-
wards MNCs, which in turn affect MNCs’ marketing assets and financial performance. Future 
research has the opportunity to validate and deepen these exploratory results to provide useful 
guidance for decision-making in sustainability strategies to both MNC managers and their stake-
holders.  
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This study has three major limitations which can be overcome in future research. First, the evi-
dence presented in this paper is largely exploratory. In particular, variables of interest such as 
alliance partners’ beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and status are measured indirectly and that 
is to say that they are implied based on related observable outcomes such as behaviors and acts 
of deference from other stakeholders. Moreover, the relationship stated in the suggested proposi-
tions among the variables of interest has analytical validity but no statistical validity. We sug-
gested  a  number  of  research  methods  to  overcome  this  limitation  by  testing  the  conceptual 
framework developed in this paper. Second, the paper does not explore in depth the structure, 
organization and processes of multi-stakeholder sustainability alliances and their role in chang-
ing alliance partners’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Among the methods suggested for future 
research in this field, we indicated case-based grounded theory as an appropriate approach to ex-
plore these variables. Third, the developed conceptual framework contributes to explaining only 
one aspect of why MNCs form sustainability alliances with a large and heterogeneous number of 
stakeholders. As discussed in Figure 2, MNCs’ use of alliance partners as signals of their sus-
tainability focus vis-à-vis other stakeholders represent only one of the two major incentives justi-
fying MNCs’ formation of such an alliance. As recently discussed in the literature, MSSAs are 
also an opportunity for MNCs to share and co-create knowledge and capabilities on sustainabil-
ity (Berger et al. 2006; Peterson 2009) and ultimately to generate innovation based on an orienta-
tion towards a larger set of stakeholders than merely customers and final consumers (Cronin et 
al. 2011; Hult 2011; Nikolaeva et al. 2011). By following both these discussed directions, future 
research has the opportunity to fully develop a theory of the formation of MSSAs that provides a 
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